201408081120 2cyvq3
inferred encrypted filler
N=36
From the post to its content
As posted (encrypted)
f0647024fd59609ce2072834b04165cf ce19c0f748de0e0c4c05fee2139cf044 812790d8ed95b2ddcdd005ac23c89b01 5751d0a5ba5798195fe9bfc520ee72d7 adf39ce6e7fb1fc06a060f0998d13b8e ce0b5e0f4c9e93ca78e2dc44e1572934 1a205df35c90b1159bdade5fc20397c4 b72a02fbd977d8526f1ed4f2a941866e d6cd18e32564651f028a07f533a67f07 a71aee6e4d669f27c924df02092dc749 bf795d3adaa200cce52833ba5bfe6638 32f491be6e38b4972b216eb1ac469999 a4f2649ec6c8d76c1c1be4a299f67a51 927a7d98f6d341b0d7ca10abaf7d67fb 93f321ffcf81b629d04f202b79f6a7b7 ac945add6d92c14a12febf722967cb37 4ded153a675ed0551caf62654328c509 fac95cc3b7156cbc053a6b0aef04daf0 14cafa519188cdef19f21a8c14c790f1 24fa6486a0a0bda706a37d4399bb155f 2c9bc29ba6f6c9aa86a8f51197eae50e cea022d4d59a016f526e1a99d1d44e75 17f6990e6d8a6e52d5df1a08173db2d7 d4891aa12297bba178cb62fb5970419e a2ddb43414f2d2b033960e7e1d0b958c 05e4bc828396be65ea59310e01bb7324 14ff3b47fb0c3781ec1ad8a79415c16f 7b6955dd7a8c7335db6ff8ec2193143d 8a8f25fd30ed8edaea9e5a386be622a6 38e554c83067c5e64890bd89cbcb3c43 96b0b5ff064b8013979815a45a9ec603 35ca2bdf0e487f34deb0a76d5dd8a6b3 3db0a9722997735932222bb983e66af4 739514a1692ac5b3f369905c06a6109a 6f770564df1e2d057e4434b119da47d0 927bbac7cefeda9a9542ccdcb5f45541 7f6a75a755598c0cf731e228fd75c720 74c1932bc648aff7dd8893c6901c7847 51de17a746ea7e37d881732d41572354 6fcc25825d7e95dbd35d8af27be4a31c f8ea1c68953054a67ce2a7e8969a4e84 6917ee07492ddc71a8919f89017be04b 4da64fcd387ce363802c80997cf52e9a 573b12ac10c41e994b719a88dc62c7bd edd203aa32e887b70b12a7b24752b1a6 8bd468b0f86e15f9246e9c7108314aba 8cd1d2b1d0e959b2177301f237d5f1d6 4ef245b4f7b4ee763708df6558531ae3 23b1c2e9f3f4a0c4d749b74047e95371 c6c6142fd59e10dc32914068fd447d67 a0e263e951c87346b56324b7589ace81 0c972032da67df7745c49234524c3cca 87e2bf72f5f8cb817958912200faccc0 7842cb1581ca2b4840b78466f4af3547 f60739560513afaa084df2b48bfa4c1e 936d5978961246ec0d18175c42be6971 af4890c97fe26e5b9d7979b53f08300d 4d6aaef12138f55bc9057f6d7071ddf5 253aea3943affcce3a81495194d4d93f b608bf3b76f08565825d2607f05888e8 d527b3f082f689f002369ce6b1309e97 80369ad1e591417d5c807a42889f4c3f 161de0fe95542e1b72aba78e95a1ea89 6886d3a347a87da07cd3deea148c6d17 cddd6d5addf78ca624cfc036f006faa5 6729886e8d93d90cf4f4dad7c061ad27 fe6532296fc35d714af75b587baf9e03 793db990d9d985ae59b870534c00d408 f69868f5114c5dea041cac8ec3769a1f 2570a720a318d755b9b879e3f1819fde 6354311be0e99f7bd61f18dde92106cb 443e7915de48726fb9b31e7628cd11bd 30f943d860b3ba72
Explanation
- Read the length. 2,320 hex characters = 64 × 36 + 16, i.e. N = 36 GUIDs encrypted with 3DES plus one 8-byte padding block. Every post-cutover filler post has exactly this shape.
- Key unknown. The post-cutover key (2013-10-16 onwards) has not been found, so the GUIDs themselves cannot be read. Everything else about the post is accounted for.
- Explain the count. Part of Fixed N=36 from 2c7ljv: an app start that posted N = 36 every time.
- Conclusion. Filler. Structure and count are explained; the GUIDs are presumed filler like every decrypted post before the cutover.