201402260800 1yz2fa
inferred encrypted filler
N=7
From the post to its content
As posted (encrypted)
b14e668ae7deb64ccd0eedea0743179c 94d34d254dfb09638a247d64d20c8fc2 dae26c5190f59e8785c38cc78ef024e1 bb1d9112fe60f6eac8ab4801edd37bb1 5aa68c6c7c8ffd3bb02a5f85beff5d17 251c9e8ed8e4185d0e222d49ce2e6611 560a822d866b8da5a051bfcfd25c8969 15662cd9219a5914bce7146df43a9562 1744383a28360fc3e436ddf588c68e13 a7a4f2cd50e87db695db87ce9d01a9de 5582f43729bd7a2a0c105ebaa7ad174b 093326a9e54c7b961647e9bdf2e73d2b 78e80339eefb5c7e09837d6d485cf52d 2aa5011f75e1495cb68e23ef2714a58f 50f4d0210b898b95
Explanation
- Read the length. 464 hex characters = 64 × 7 + 16, i.e. N = 7 GUIDs encrypted with 3DES plus one 8-byte padding block. Every post-cutover filler post has exactly this shape.
- Key unknown. The post-cutover key (2013-10-16 onwards) has not been found, so the GUIDs themselves cannot be read. Everything else about the post is accounted for.
- Explain the count. Grouped in feb2014c: two accounts, 3 + 6 values; shared stream negative, per-account streams unidentifiable (best strict hit Next(0,23), ~7 % chance, rejected)
- Conclusion. Filler. Structure and count are explained; the GUIDs are presumed filler like every decrypted post before the cutover.