201402151359 1xzbei
inferred encrypted filler
N=5
From the post to its content
As posted (encrypted)
8f08b52f169aa752b9b25f3024fc378a 475349b9cf8c2623677a3abc1b18fd5f 9152ee67cbb98aaddce2cc069b85e4eb 483edaf00d6f515897bbc28674ae1730 0756434ab2ec9b065f395958e1380b8c ffbe04c0c2fde739eb3190f45c32c6f6 f33b113f8088052bdb6f41d9571febd2 f109e2dcd2311c5ec793dc97205aafcd 1f16ed9d4abff972a5558354d31606c7 f7cd6c235ffd022983177f2e5047acfe 13a4aee43fa68acc
Explanation
- Read the length. 336 hex characters = 64 × 5 + 16, i.e. N = 5 GUIDs encrypted with 3DES plus one 8-byte padding block. Every post-cutover filler post has exactly this shape.
- Key unknown. The post-cutover key (2013-10-16 onwards) has not been found, so the GUIDs themselves cannot be read. Everything else about the post is accounted for.
- Explain the count. This post is draw 7 of Run 58 (seed 115,354,343):
new Random(115354343), Next(0,44) per post. The RNG predicts N = 5; the post has N = 5 ✓. The seed is the machine's uptime in ms when the app started (boot 2014-02-13 08:57–11:57). - Conclusion. Filler. Structure and count are explained; the GUIDs are presumed filler like every decrypted post before the cutover.